) is available online. 4 The other root is our role as peer reviewers of a World Bank study (Holzmann and Hinz 2005) , whose analysis we regard as incomplete.
This article starts with the relevant economic theory, addressing core analytical principles and some lamentably common analytical errors. Part 2 discusses implications for policy.
A central argument is that the primary cause of the pensions 'crisis' in many countries is a failure to adapt to very long-run trends: increasing life expectancy (with some sad exceptions), declining fertility, and earlier retirement. 5 Superimposed are two more recent phenomena: the baby boom (widespread, though not universal) and the general increase in the scale of pension systems. Reform to address financing issues can also be an occasion to improve pension design.
Pension systems with contribution rates, monthly benefits, and retirement ages set for an earlier era are not consistent with the longer retirements implied by increasing life expectancy, earlier average retirement and the additional rise in dependency rates implied by declining fertility. Some adjustment is necessary, and would be even without the baby boom, given the striking similarity in age pyramids projected for 2050 for China (which has a onechild policy), the United States, which had a baby boom, and India, which had neither (Barr and Diamond (2008, Fig. 1 .5). The main source of financing problems is that, apart from adjustment to price and wage growth, traditional defined-benefit (DB) systems have had a static design with no automatic adjustment to demographic trends. This problem is not
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